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The House of Lords has reaffirmed the well-established rule,
that when a debtor pays money to his creditor without approAppropriation priating it to particular items of indebtedness, the
of Payments right of appropriation devolves upon the creditor,
and he may exercise that right up to the very last moment, by
action or otherwise, the application of the money being governed, not by any rigid rule of law, but by the intention of the
creditor, expressed, implied, or presumed; and that the rule
in Clayton's Case, I Meriv. 585, I816, that in case of a running account the items are to be set off against each other in
their order, does not apply to a case where there is no running
account, or where from an account rendered, or other circumstances, it appears that the creditor intended not to make any
appropriation, but to reserve the right to do so: Cory Brothers
Co. v. Owners of Turkish Steamship "Mecca," [1897] A. C.
286.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has recently held, in
accord with its prior decisions, that § 864 of the Kentucky
Statutes, which recognizes the right of a building
Building
association to require borrowing members to pay
A~ssociations,

Usurious
Interest,
Constitutional

dues or premiums in addition to interest at the
rate of six per cent., the rate fixed by law as to

all other borrowers of money, violates § 59 of
the constitution, forbidding the general assembly
to pass local or special laws "to regulate the rate of interest," since the transaction is in effect a borrowing and lending of money, and the dues or premiums exacted are in the
nature of interest; and that it also violates § 3 of the bill
of rights, which provides that "no grant of exclusive separate
public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or
set of men, except in consideration of past services:" Simpson
v. Kentucky Citizens' Bdg. & Loan Assn., 41 S. W. Rep. 570.
It has also held that such a loan by a foreign building association, secured by mortgage on land in Kentucky, is a Kentucky
loan, and governed by its usury laws: Pryse v. Peoples' Bdg.,
Loan & Say. Assn., 41 S. W. Rep. 574.
Law
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The Supreme Court of California has declared that the colInheritance
Tax,
ConstitutionExmty,
exemptlons

lateral inheritance tax law of that state (Stat. 1893,.
p. 193), is not unconstitutional, though it does

not tax inheritances by brothers and sisters of
the deceased, while taxing inheritances by the
children of such brothers and sisters, and though

it exempts inheritances not exceeding $500: In re
Wilmerding's Estate, 49 Pac. Rep. I8I.

The fact that an association has been formed for the purpose
Conspiracy,

of controlling or fixing the price of merchandise

or property, in violation of statute, gives no right
of action against the association to one to whom
it refuses to sell such merchandise or property:
Brewster v. Miller, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 41 S. W.
Trust,

Right of
Action

Rep. 301.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recently held constitutional an act of the legislature providing that the state or
Constitutional county should only be liable for costs in certain.
Law,

Costs in

classes of criminal cases, although it was attacked
on the grounds (I)

that it worked a great hard-

ship on officers and witnesses; (2) that it required
their services without compensation; (3) that it
was not general; (4) that it deprived the accused of a fair and
impartial trial, by putting a premium on conviction; and (5)
that it amended previous laws relating to fees and costs without naming them: State v. Henley, 41 S. W. Rep. 352.
The important parts of the statute in question are as follows: "Neither the state of Tennessee, nor any county thereof,
shall pay or be liable in any criminal prosecution for any costs
or fees hereafter accruing, except in the following classes of
cases :
" (I)Cases of homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, embezzlement, incest or bigamy, when the prosecution has proceeded to a verdict in the circuit or criminal court;
" (2) Cases under the small offense law where the defendant
has submitted before a justice of the peace and been sent to
the Workhouse, and
"(3) All cases where the defendant has been convicted in
a court of record and the execution issued upon the judgment
against the defendant has been returned nulla bona: provided:
"That neither the state of Tennessee, nor any county
Criminal
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thereof, shall be liable for, or pay any costs in any criminal
case where security has been accepted by the officer taking
the security, and an execution afterwards returned nulla bona
as to the defendant and his securities.
"Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that neither the state of
Tennessee, nor any county thereof, shall pay or be liable in
any criminal case or prosecution for the fees, costs, or mileage
which may hereafter accrue in favor of any witness who shall,
at the time of his attendance as such witness, before any
court, grand jury, or magistrate, reside within five miles of the
place where he attends as such witness."

Creditors of a corporation that has made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors release their rights under the assignCorporations, ment when they consent to a plan of reorganizaReorganization, tion, and accept bonds of the reorganized comRights of
pany in payment of their claims: FirstNatl. Bk.
Creditors
of Chattanooga,Tenn., v. Radford Trust Co., (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,) 8o Fed. Rep. 569.
A provision in a general corporation law that directors must
file an annual report of the condition of the corporation, and
that on failure to do so they shall be liable for the
Directors,
Failure to debts of the company contracted within a specified
File Report time is germane to the subject of the act as
expressed in the title "an act to provide for the formation of
corporations," and the act is not unconstitutional on that
ground: Ludinglon v. Heilman, (Court of Appeals of Colorado,) 49 Pac. Rep. 377.
Wheeler, Dist. J., of the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York, has ruled that the liability imposed by
the statutes of Maryland, (Code Pub. Gen. Laws,
Officers,
Liability for Art. 23, §§ 67, 69,) on the directors and officers
Illegal
of a corporation who declare dividends rendering
Dividend,
the corporation insolvent or impairing its capital,
Survival
or who make loans to stockholders, is not a liability
for wrongs to property rights and interests, such as that the
cause of action therefor survives against the representatives of
a deceased director or officer, under the statutes of New
York, (2 Rev. Stat. N. Y. p. 447, § I) : Boston & Af R. R.
Co. v. Graves, 8o Fed. Rep. 588.
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In a recent case in the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
one M., who was the president and general manager and
owned all the stock of a corporation, except a
Sole Owner
shares which belonged to his ward, conveyed,
few
Stock,
of
in his individual capacity, to his son, certain real
Rights of
Transferee of estate of the corporation by a general warranty
deed, purporting to grant a fee simple, in considProperty
eration of a sum due the son from the estate of his mother,
the grantor's wife. For several years prior to the conveyance,
the corporation had ceased to do business, or keep up its
organization. Under these circumstances, it was held that the
grantee was the "sole, absolute and unconditional owner" of
the property in fee, within the meaning of a policy of fire
insurance upon the premises: PhoenixAssur. Co. of London v.
Deavenport, 41 S. W. Rep. 399.
This is consistent with the decision in McElroy v. Minnesota
Percheron Horse Co., 71 N. W. Rep. 652, 1897, 36 AM. L.
REG. N. S. 51 . Such cases are not an exception to the general rule, that the ownership of all of the stock of a corporation does not dissolve the corporation, or vest the title to its
property in the sole owner, but rest on a different principle.
When a sheriff, having a warrant for the arrest of a man
charged with larceny, takes a citizen's horse, and
County,
Liability for pursues and overtakes the felon, but in doing so
Acts of

Officers

overdrives and injures the horse, the county is

not liable for its value: Randles v. Waukesha Co.,.

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 71 N. W. Rep. 1034.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has reasserted the
settled rule, that when two or more persons perish in the same
disaster, and there is no way of determining
Death,
presumption, which died first, the presumption, as far as the

wili,
right of succession to their estates is concerned, is
Construction that all died at the same moment; and holds (i)
that when three testatrices (sisters) die in this manner, a
bequest or devise from one to another does not take effect ;
and (2) That as in the case in hand each left a will devising
all her estate to her two sisters, directing that after the decease
of the last surviving sister, $5oo each should be paid to two
nieces, and $200 to one S., out of the proceeds remaining
after payment of debts, the surviving niece, (one having died
during the lifetime of the sisters,) was entitled to $5oo and
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S. to $2oo out of the personal estate of each of the three
sisters, while their heirs were entitled to the residue of that
and to the real estate, as if no will had been made: In re
Wibor, 37 Atl. Rep. 634.
Under the laws of Washington, which provide that "any
ballot or parts of a ballot from which it is impossible to deterlections, mine the elector's choice, shall be void and shall
not be counted; provided, that when a ballot is
Ballots
sufficiently plain to gather therefrom a part of the voter's
intention, it shall be the duty of the judges of election to
count such part," (Laws 1895, p. 393, § IO,) that "no ballot
shall bear any impression, device, color or thing designated
to distinguish such ballot from other legal ballots, or whereby
the same may be known or designated . . . " (Laws 1895, p.
393, § i I,) and that no ticket shall be lost for want of form,
or mistake in initials of names, if the board of judges can
determine to their satisfaction the person voted for and the
office intended, (Gen. Stat. Wash. § 413,) no ballot is vitiated
by marks, other than those required by statute, made by a
voter in an honest effort to express his choice, or by a variance from the prescribed method of marking the ballot, where
the intention is not apparent; and consequently ballots on
which the cross is placed at the left of the candidate's name,
instead of at the right, in which two crosses, instead of one,
are placed opposite the name, in which a cross is placed
opposite one name, and the name of the opposing candidate
is erased, in which a cross is placed after the name of each of
two opposing candidates, and one of those marks is erased or
scratched over, and in which the words yes," c"no," "for"
or "against" are written opposite questions to be voted on,
are valid. But, on the other hand, ballots are vitiated by any
marks which obviously were not made with any intention to
express the choice of the elector; and hence ballots with the
words "Rats," "don't want any king," and the names of
persons not candidates written on them, are void: State v.
Fawcett, (Supreme Court of Washington,) 49 Pac. Rep. 346.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has very justly decided,
that ,f a blind man, believing in good faith that he is submit1sabllty
ting his case to the proper officer, allows an
unauthorized person to mark his ballot, the ballot
is not void under a statute (Acts Tenn. 189o, c. 24, § I6,)
which provides that only the officer holding the election can
lawfully mark ballots for persons disabled from marking them
themselves: Moore v. Sharp, 41 S. W. Rep. 587.

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

The Supreme Court of Texas recently ruled that the taking of land for public use is not in the nature of a conveyance, but is the exercise of the superior title of
Eminent
Domain,
the government; and consequently the appropriaCondemnation tion of the lands of a married woman is comof Land of
pleted when the proper authority decides to take
Married
Woman
the land and pays for it, no matter in what mode
payment is effected, compliance with the statutory requirements as to conveyance by married women being unnecessary.
As a corollary of this, it follows that a married woman may,
with the consent of her husband, waive the invalidity of a condemnation of her separate property for public use, by accepting the compensation awarded, without executing a waiver in
the statutory form: City of San Antonio v. Grandean, 41
S. W. Rep. 477.

A returned letter is inadmissible to prove that the person
to whom it was addressed did not live in the
place to which it was directed: Dawson v. State,
Evidence,
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,) 41 S.

W. Rep. 599An officer of a corporation, who, by false and fraudulent
statements, induces certain persons to purchase worthless
stock in the corporation, is guilty of obtaining
Pretenses

money under false pretenses, though the title to

the money obtained passed to the corporation; and
it is no defense that after the corporation obtained the money
he received none of it: Commonwealth v. Langley, (Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 47 N. E. Rep. 51 I.
In a recent case before the Court of Appeal of England,
Trustee of the Propertyof New, Prance & Garrardv. Hunting,
Fraudulent [1897] 2 Q. B. 19, affirming [1897] i Q. B. 607,
Conveyance, a bankrupt, two days before his bankruptcy, exeBankruptcy, cuted a deed, by which he conveyed an estate to a
Preference

third person upon trust to raise thereout by
sale
or mortgage £4200, and to make good therewith divers

breaches of trust which he had committed in respect of certain
scheduled estates of which he was trustee. This was held not
to be a fraudulent preference, because the object of the bankrupt in executing it was not to prefer some creditors to others,
but to shield himself from the consequences of the breaches of
trust committed by him.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

When a broker receives money from his principal to be used
for gambling in futures, and actually deals with
third parties, from whom he realizes profits in the
ations
Principal and course of these illegal transactions, he is responsible, as agent, to his principal, as for money had
Agent, as
Liability
Agent
and received for the principal, for the amount of
the profits thus realized: Loverjy v, Kaufman,
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 41 S. W. Rep. 507.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has adopted the prevailing doctrine, that when an officer of the law, acting either
under police rules or on his own responsibility,
arnishment, takes from a prisoner personal property in no way
Property of
Criminal

connected with the criminal charge, either for its
safe keeping, or to remove from his control that
which might be used in effecting his escape, such property is
not liable to garnishment in the officer's hands, or in those of
any one with whom he deposits them: Hill v. Hatch, 41 S.
W. Rep. 349.
A shipowner may make out his own average statement, and
is notbound to employ an average stater (Americanic , adjuster,)
either at the port of discharge or elsewhere; and
General
Average,
when, by an average bond executed at the port of
Bond,
discharge, the consignees of cargo undertake to
Statement
furnish to the shipowners a correct account and
particulars of the value of the goods delivered, in order
that the amount of average contribution to which they are
liable may be ascertained and adjusted "in the usual manner,"
these words do not imply as a condition of the obligation that
the shipowners shall employ an average stater at the port of
discharge: Wavertree Sailing Ship Co. v. Love, (Judicial Cornmittee of the Privy Council,) [897] A. C. 373.

An infant can make a binding contract of apprenticeship to
learn a useful trade, and cannot avoid that contract on becoming of age; and if he violates it, he will be bound
Infant,
Apprentice- by a clause therein providing for the retention
ship
and forfeiture of part of the wages due him:
Padey v. American Ship-Windlass Co., (Supreme Court of
Rhode Island,) 37 At. Rep. 706.
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The courts of New York will not enjoin the prosecution of
an action between citizens of New York in another state,
Injunction, merely because the rule in that state as to eviRestraining dence of transactions with decedents is more
Action in
liberal than in New York, and the action involves
Other State such a transaction; the difference is merely one
of evidence, not of substantive right: Edgell v. Clarke,
(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department,) 45 N. Y. Suppl. 979.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently decided,
that a contract to indemnify a common carrier of passengers
indemnity, against losses occurring from injuries to pasInsurance, sengers carried by it is not invalid as against
Public Polcy public policy, on the ground that it covers losses
resulting from their negligence or the negligence of its servants :
Trenton Pass. R. R. Co. v. Guarantors'Liability Indemnity Co.,
37 Atl. Rep. 6o9.
Under a policy providing for payment to the insured of all
sums which he "may become liable for in damages " for personal injuries, and that the insurer shall have
Liability
insurance,
charge of all litigation against the insured for such
Accrual of
damages, the liability of the insurer accrues when
Liability
that of the insured for certain damages has been
finally determined, though he has not paid the same; but the
liability of the insured for damages is not determined by a
judgment against him, so as to render the insurer liable, while
an appeal from the judgment is pending: Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Fordyce, (Supreme Court of Arkansas,) 41 S. W. Rep.
420.

The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, has lately held, reversing 41 N. Y. Suppl. 839,
(36 AM. L. REG. N. S. 146,) that when one of the
Life
intermediate premiums on a life policy payable to
Insurance,
Payment of

the wife of the assured was paid with her money,
the fact that the other premiums were paid with
witu stoien stolen funds does not give the person from whom
Funds
the funds were stolen a right to the.entire proceeds
of the policy, subject to a lien in favor of the beneficiary, for
the sum contributed by her, but entitles the latter to her bro
rata share 'of the proceeds: Dayton v. H. B. Claflin Co., 45
N. Y. Suppl. 1005.
'The Court of Appeal of England has affirmed the decision
of Collins, J., in Universo Ins. Co. of Milan v. Merchants'
Premiums
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Marine
Insurance,
Payment of

Premium

Marine Ins. Co., [1897] I Q. B. 205, (36 AM. L.
REG. N. S. 264,) that the rule of law, founded on
mercantile custom, by which the broker, and not
the assured, is liable to the underwriter for the

premium on a policy of marine insurance, is not limited to the
ordinary form of Lloyd's policy, but extends also to a "company's policy," which contains a promise by the assured to
pay the premium : Universo Ins. Co. of Milan v. Merchants'
Afarine Ins. Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 93.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has recently decided,
that Article 13, § I9, of the constitution of that state, which
provides that the presiding officer of each house
Joint
Resolution,
shall sign all bills and joint resolutions " after the
Title,
titles have been publicly read," presupposes that a
Effect
joint resolution will have a title, though
it does
not expressly require, it, and consequently, when the title to
a joint resolution is adopted after due consideration, it may be
referred to and considered by the courts for the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the legislature in adopting the
resolution, if there is any doubt as to what that intention is,
just as the title of a statute, which, under. constitutional provisions, now governs the enacting part: Lovett v. Ferguson, 71
N. W. Rep. 765.
A publication that describes a fire in the plaintiff's building,
and also refers to two previous fires in the same building, conLibel
cluding with the following words, " Every fire in
this building has started on the upper floor, and
twice in Reid's printing establishment," contains no defamatory
language, and is not capable of meaning to charge the plaintiff,
Reid, the owner of the printing office, with incendiarism; and
when words are not in their nature defamatory, the publisher
is not liable therefor, though special damages result: Reid v.,
ProvidenceJournal Co., (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,) 37
Atl. Rep. 637.
In a curious (and unprecedented) case before Wright, J., of
the Queen's Bench Division, the defendant, by way of a
practical joke, falsely represented to the plaintiff, a
Negligence,
Cause of
married woman, that her husband had met with a
Action,
serious accident, and that both his legs were
Practical
Joke,
broken. This statement was made with the
Nervous
intent that it should be believed. The plaintiff
Shock
believed it, and in consequence suffered a nervous
shock which brought on an attack of illness. Upon these
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facts the court held that she had a good cause of action
Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57.
It has been recently decided by Stirling, J., of the Chancery
Division, that a news agency may collect information firom a
News Agency, public source and transmit it to subscribers to
Unpublished whom it is new upon the terms that they shall not
Information, communicate it to third parties; and a court of
Copying by
equity will enjoin a subscriber from communicating
Rival,
Injunction
such information to a third party in breach of
his contract, and will also enjoin a third party from inducing a
subscriber to break his contract by supplying him with such
information with a view to publication: Exchange Telegraph
Co., Ltd., v. Central News, Ltd., [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
The news was communicated by ticker; and the contract provided that "the news supplied by the company is to be used
oniy in the newspapers or posted only in the club, news-room,
office, or other place at which it is delivered. No copy of
it shall be made for any other purpose than for such publication, and it shall not be transmitted, communicated, or
delivered to any other party or parties by messenger, telegraph, telephone, or otherwise, nor shall the subscriber assign
the benefit of the whole or part of this agreement, nor let
upon hire the instrument or the right to use it nor in any
way part with the possession of the instrument without the
written consent of the company."
The only case at all similar to this is that of the Exchange
Tel. Co. v. Gregory, [1896] I Q. B. 147, (35 Am. L. REG. N. S.
258 ;) when the same plaintiff secured an injunction to restrain
the defendant from publishing the news collected by it, which
had been surreptitiously obtained by the latter.
An employe, who, while earning weekly wages, constructs
with his employer's tools and materials, in his
Patents,
Invention by shop, machines which the latter uses as part of
Employe,
his tools, without knowledge of any objection
Implied
thereto, cannot, after obtaining a patent, enjoin his
License for
Use by
employer from further use of the particular maEmployer chines; an irrevocable license to use them will be
implied: Blauvelt v. Interior Conduit & Insulation Co., (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,) 8o Fed. Rep. 906.
One who makes and sells one element of a patented combination, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing about
Contributory its use in such a combination, is guilty of contribuInfringement tory infringement, and is equally liable with him
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who in fact organizes the complete combination: ThomsonHouston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., (Circuit Court of
Appeals, Sixth Circuit,) 8o Fed. Rep. 712, affirming 78 Fed.
Rep. 139, 1896.
The principle of this case is settled by an unbroken chain
of authority: Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 65, 1871 ;
Renwick v. Pond, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 569, 1872; Turrell v.
Spaeth, 8 0. G. 986, 1875 ; Richardson v. Noyes, io 0. G.
507, 1876; Rumford Cliem. Works v. Hooker, io 0. G. 289,
1876; Bowkerv. Dows, 3 Ban. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 518, 1878;
Boyd v. Cherry, 4 McCrary, (U. S.) 70, 1883; Cotton Tie Co.
v. Simmons, io6 U. S. 89, 1882 ; Schneider v. Pountney, 21
Fed. Rep. 399, 1884; Travers v. Beyer, 26 Fed. Rep. 450,
I886; Alabastine Co. v. Payne, 27 Fed. Rep. 559, 1886;
Geis v. Kimber, 36 Fed. Rep. 105, 1888 ; Lea v. Northwestern
Stove Repair Co., 5o Fed. Rep. 202, 1892; Thomson-Houston
Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Ry. Specialty Co., 75 Fed. Rep.
1005, 1896, modifying 72 Fed. Rep. ioi6, 1896.
But the mere fact that the parts thus manufactured may be
used for an improper purpose is not sufficient to prove contributory infringement; it must be proved that they are intended
to be so used, or that they cannot be used otherwise. Barnes
v. Straits, 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 553, 1872; Keystone Bridge Co.
v. Phoenix Iron Co., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 468, 1872; SaXe v.
Hammond, I Holmes, (U. S.) 456, 1875 ; Maynard v. Pawling,
3 Fed. Rep. 711, I88o; Campbell v. Kavanaug, 20 Blatchf.
(U. S.) 256, 1882; Snyderv. Bunnell, 38 0. G. 1130, 1886;
Bliss v. Mferrill, 42 0. G. 97, 1887.
A statute, (Stat. Ky. § 4223,) requiring itinerant vendors of
patent rights to have written across the face of the notes exePolice Power, cuted to them in payment therefor the word "PedRestrictionon dler's note," is a valid exercise of the police
Sale
power of the state, and does not conflict with the
federal laws: Union Nal. Bk. v. Brown, (Court of Appeals of
Kentucky,) 41 S. W. Rep. 273.
The rule that income wrongfully applied by a receiver to
the payment of interest on mortgages, or the improvement of
the property of the corporation, must be restored,
Railroads,
Receiver,
cannot be applied when it is impossible to ascerDiversion of tain whether these expenditures have been made
Income
out of the income, or out of money borrowed:
Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. East Tenn. V & G. R. R. Co.,
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,) 8o Fed. Rep. 624.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided, that when
a railroad company fails to give the proper signals of the
Crossings, approach of a train, and a collision ensues with
with an electric street railway car, the former company
Electric Car, cannot recover from the street railway company

Collision

Degree of

Care,

Signals

for losses due to the collision, if its failure to give
the signals

contributed thereto;

that the fact

that the two companies have a mutual agreement providing for a derailing switch on the tracks of the electric railway,
as a precaution against collision at that crossing, and also
providing, that before an electric car shall be permitted to
pass over the crossing the conductor of that car who shall be
operating the derailing switch shall look in both directions,
and listen for the approach of railroad trains, does not
excuse the railroad company from giving the statutory signals
as a warning of approaching trains; and that when the neglect to give such signals appears to have contributed to the
collision, the railroad company cannot recover against the
electric street railway company, although the conductor of
the electric car who operated the derailing switch was negligent in failing to look in both directions, and to listen for
approaching trains: N. Y & G. L. Ry. Co. v. N. J. Electric
Ry. Co., 37 Atl. Rep. 627.
A railroad upon which electricity is used as the motive power
is a railroad, within a statutory provision- (Code Ala., 1886,
Electric
Railroads

i145,) that when the tracks of two railroads

cross each other, engineers and conductors must
cause the trains of which they are in charge to
come to a full stop within one hundred feet of the crossing,
and not proceed until they know the way to be clear, the train
on the railroad having the older right of way being entitled to
cross first: Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Anchors, (Supreme
Court of Louisiana,) 22 So. Rep. 279.

A petition in mandamus, which seeks to compel the principal, the superintendent, and the trustees of a
Schools,
school to reinstate a boy in the school, is insuffiw
Reinstatement of Pupil, cient when it does not set forth all the facts, so
that it might appear whether or not the suspenMandamus,
Sufcienc of sion of the boy was wrongful, and there is no
averment that application was made to any of the
school authorities to have the boy reinstated: Cochran v.
Palillo, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 41 S. W. Rep. 537.
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Under a statute, (Stat. Ky. § 4141,) which provides that a
sheriff shall be liable on his bond "for any misconduct or
default of his deputy," a sheriff is liable for the
Sheriff,
Liabilityfor tortious act of his deputy in unnecessarily and
Tort of
maliciously placing handcuffs on a prisoner, and
Deputy
leading him through the streets of a city while
thus handcuffed: Shields v. Pflanz, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 41 S. W. Rep. 267.
An agreement between two rival applicants for a street railway franchise to combine in order to prevent competition
between themselves or by others in procuring the
Specific
Performance, franchise, and to avoid the imposition of conditions
illegal
by the municipal authorities, is void as against
Contract,
public policy; and equity will not compel the
Public Policy specific performance
of such a contract, so as to
compel one of the parties to share with the others the fruits
of their combination: Byer v. Richmond Traction Co., (Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,) 80 Fed. Rep. 839.
An insurance company cannot be subrogated in case of
loss to the insured's right of action against one
Subrogaion, who sold him the insured property through frauduInsurance
lent misrepresentations of its value: Farners'Fire
Ins. Co. v.Johnston, (Supreme Court of Michigan,) 71 N. W.
Rep. 1074.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, the authority to sue the state, granted
by the legislature, includes also the authority to
prosecute the suit to judgment, and the authority
to keep the judgment in force; and consequently

Suits Against
State,
Revival of
Judgment

to revive the judgment by action before it is barred by prescription: Carter v. State, 22 So. Rep. 400.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that a father
who does not permit his minor son to use a gun is not responsible in damages for the act of the son in carelessly
Torts,
Responsibility and purposely shooting at and injuring a comof Fatherfor panion, while out hunting with an air-gun, without
Acts of Child his father's knowledge: Ritterv. ThibodeaUx, 41 S.
W. Rep. 492.
The purchase of a toy air-gun by a father for his child is
not an act of culpable negligence, since it is not obviously and
intrinsically dangerous; and consequently the father is not
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liable for the wrongful act of another boy, who obtains it
without his knowledge or consent, and uses it so as to injure
another: Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225, I89I; Harris
v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 1892.
The father of a child, who is its natural guardian, has such
a right to its dead body that he may maintain an action against
one to whom he entrusted the child for treatment,
Property
and who, without his consent, performed an
Rights.

autopsy on the dead body: Burney v. Chldren's
Hospital in. Boston, (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts,) 47 N. E. Rep. 401.
A widow may recover for the unlawful mutilation of her
deceased husband's body by an unauthorized autopsy or dissection: Larson v. Chase,47 Minn. 307, 1891 ; Foley v. Phelps,
i App. Div. (N. Y.) 551, 1896; and a husband may recover
for the unlawful dissection of the body of his wife: Anon., 3
Chic. L. News, 378, 1871.
But in the absence of proof of
fraudulent or malicious motive, neither a coroner, who has the
power of ordering an autopsy, nor the physician who performs
it by his order, can be held liable therefor: Young v. College
of Phtysiians & Surgeons, 81 Md. 359, 1895.
A patron of a place of amusement, who has paid his
admission fee, and has not by his conduct forfeited his right
to remain, is not bound to leave on request of the
Place of
Amusement, proprietors; if he refuses to leave, they have no
Ejection
right to eject him ; he is entitled to resist ejection
with all the force necessary to protect himself; and if they do
eject him, he can recover damages: Cremore v. Huber,
(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second
Department.) 45 N. Y. Suppl. 947Dead Bodies

According to a recent decision by Coxe, Dist. J., in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, " where
the goods of a manufacturer have become popular
Unfair
Competition, not.only because of their intrinsic worth, but also
Advertising by reason of the ingenious, attractive and persistent manner in which they have been advertised, the good-will
thus created is entitled to protection. The money invested in
advertising is as much a part of the business as if invested in
buildings, or machinery, and a rival in business has no more
right to use the one than the other,-no more right to use the
machinery by which the goods are placed on the market than
the machinery which originally created them :" Hilson Co. v.
Foster, 8o Fed. Rep. 896.
Ardemus Stewart.

